Abstract: Philip Pettit has argued that the goods of attachment, virtue, and respect are robust goods in the sense that they require both the actual provision of certain benefits and the modally robust provision of these benefits. He also claims that we value the robustness of these goods because it diminishes our vulnerability to others. I question whether robustness really reduces vulnerability and argue that even if it does, vulnerability reduction is not the reason we value robustness. In place of Pettit's account, I defend a promotional account of the value of robustness. I argue that we value robustness because it increases the probability we will enjoy a certain kind of benefit.
Introduction
In his recent book, The Robust Demands of the Good (2015) , Pettit has extended the ideas behind his well-known republican conception of freedom (Pettit 1997 ) to a more general class of robust goods for which, he claims, modal robustness is also a constitutive feature. In the first three chapters, Pettit characterises the robust goods of attachment, virtue, and respect and in the last three he considers implications that robust goods have for the moral evaluation of our actions. In between, in chapter four, he argues we value the robustness of robust goods because it reduces our vulnerability to others by providing us with 'a certain protection or security in relation to others, in particular others whom we take to enjoy freedom of will' (Pettit 2015, p. 121) .
In this article I will focus on Pettit's account of the value of robustness, arguing that his vulnerability-based account cannot successfully explain what is valuable about the robustness of robust goods. The next two sections outline Pettit's accounts of robust goods and his argument that we value the vulnerability reduction robustness entails. In the fourth section I critique Pettit's argument against an alternative, promotional account of the value of robustness. In the fifth section I provide an argument in favour of the promotional account. Section six concludes.
Pettit's account

Robust goods
One broad goal of Pettit's book is to show that consequentialism can be sensitive to the dispositions out of which certain acts are performed. In particular, he argues that three central components of living a good life-attachment, virtue, and respect-are the 'thick' correlates of 'thin', disposition-independent acts (Pettit 2015, pp. 3f.) . Thin acts are transformed into thick (robust) goods when they are provided in a modally robust way. For example, the thin act of care, which Pettit defines as 'a complex form of indulgence in which you discriminate in my favour' becomes the robust good of love when you 'provide me with care, not just actually, but across certain possible variations on actual circumstances ' (2015, p. 28) . More specifically, robust goods are provided if and only if 1 the thin good is actually 2 and robustly provided in the all possible worlds satisfying three conditions: priming, support, and modesty.
The priming condition is satisfied when the stimulus or prompt that primes the exercise of the thin good is present (Pettit 2015, p. 48) . So, for the actual provision of truth telling to be the associated robust good of honesty, A must tell B the truth in possible worlds where there are reasons, stimuli, or prompts (such as B's request for information) to do so. Honesty does not, however, require that A tell the truth in worlds in which there are no reasons for doing so; that is, worlds in which there is no primer for the act.
The support condition further limits the set of worlds in which the thin good must be provided to worlds where the provision of the thin good is supported by the reasons of the robust good. For example, as Pettit writes, the reason that honesty provides for truth telling to someone who requires information... is bound to be pro tanto in character. It is bound to be a reason that is sometimes outweighed by the balance of other considerations. (2015, p. 49) 1 Pettit argues that 'it is necessary for you as a lover to provide me with care, not just actually, but under variations on actual circumstances that preserve suitable priming and support and satisfy modesty. Is it sufficient for giving me love that you provide the care robustly over all variations that satisfy those three constraints? [...] I am happy to assume that it is ' (2015, p. 30) . 2 Pettit argues that 'since "robustly" implies "actually" [...] the fact that you robustly provide me with care means that you actually provide it ' (2015, p. 21). Finally, the modesty condition further restricts the set of worlds by excluding 'immodest' worlds in which changes in circumstance block or destroy an agent's disposition to provide the thin good (Pettit 2015, p. 28) . Pettit argues, 'it would be crazy to think you are not virtuous now because there are some possible scenarios where the virtue is disrupted or disabled and you would not manifest it in action' (2015, p. 62); however, he cautions that the idea is not that in the situation envisaged you would retain the disposition and the capacity to exercise it but fail because of contingent difficulties [... but] a more radical one in which [...] you permanently or temporarily lose the disposition. (2015, p. 29) Thus, on Pettit's account, A provides B with a robust good iff she actually provides the associated thin good and she provides it robustly, that is, in all worlds where there are reasons or prompts to provide it, these reasons are not overridden by countervailing considerations, and the world is not an immodest world where her disposition to provide the thin good has been blocked or destroyed.
Valuing robustness
It is uncontroversial that we value goods that are robust in Pettit's sense. After all, the general domains of attachment, virtue, and respect are central to our lives. But Pettit thinks that robust goods are not only valuable, they are more valuable than thin goods. Since only the difference between robust goods and thin goods is robust provision, this must mean that robustness itself confers the difference making value. This too is a compelling claim. Love seems more valuable than mere care, honesty more valuable than mere truth telling, and respect more valuable than mere non-interference with my wishes. But if robustness itself is valuable, why is it so?
Pettit argues that we value robustness because it 'gives us a certain protection or security in relation to others, in particular others whom we take to enjoy freedom of will'; it reduces our vulnerability to these others (2015, p. 121). Pettit's argument 3 for this explanation, which I reproduce here in full, is as follows:
1. We ascribe free will to one another in many choices, assuming that we each have a capacity to enact any of the options presented in such a choice. 2. Thus, according to that assumption, when another person is able to harm us, we are subject to the other's power to impose that harm or not.
3 Though Pettit describes these claims about the vulnerability approach as 'the argument for this position' they are not strictly speaking deductively valid (2015, p. 121) .
3. That vulnerability will not decrease just because the probability of harm decreases in any old fashion: say, because the other likes us. 4. But the vulnerability will decrease if the probability of harm decreases as a result of measures that protect or secure use against the other. 5. The dispositions of attachment, virtue, and respect, whether discretionary or constrained, protect us against a denial of associated benefits by another. 6. And it is because we value this protection or security that we value the robust provision of thin benefits that the dispositions guarantee. 4 (2015, p. 122) The first four claims define the kind of vulnerability that is reduced by robustness. (Pettit 2015, p. 127) . But, as the fourth premise states, vulnerability may decrease when measures make harmful options unavailable; when they are, in a sense, 'removed' from the menu. The fifth premise claims dispositions of attachment, virtue, and respect enact these protective measures, thus reducing vulnerability. Pettit claims robustness can reduce vulnerability both subjectively and objectively. Objective reductions in vulnerability 'involve the removal of the harmful option altogether from the menu of options' (Pettit 2015, p. 129) . Robust goods can objectively reduce vulnerability through the censure involved in the violation of social norms associated with them. Subjective reductions restrict the considerations 'you are in a subjective position to treat as relevant, [as when] you are deceived about the considerations that support harming me, by being manipulated [...] coerced [...] or perhaps by being forced' (Pettit 2015, p. 129) . Robust goods can subjectively reduce vulnerability by requiring the adoption of a distinctive deliberative profile that excludes options harmful to those towards whom we hold the associated dispositions.
We certainly seem protected against others when, and to the degree that, they provide us with robust goods. And such vulnerability production is certainly valuable. However, on closer examination, Pettit's vulnerability-based explanation of the value of robustness encounters problems.
Two challenges to Pettit's account
If we are to value robustness because it decreases vulnerability, then, of course, robustness must actually succeed in having this effect. The first five premises seek to that robustness can successfully reduce vulnerability. However, it is unclear that Pettit's argument succeeds.
Does robustness reduce vulnerability?
First, note that robustness is not necessary for vulnerability reduction. Our vulnerability to others can be reduced in many ways. Pettit himself notes that the objective limits on the considerations that provide relevant supports for harming me [...] might be introduced by non-intentional factors, even brute nature; by my own efforts in self-defence; or by the efforts of third parties, including the community or state. (2015, pp. 128f.) These factors may overlap with the robust provision of thin goods in certain cases, but they are surely not coextensive. Now, to be sure, the fact that robustness is not necessary for vulnerability reduction is not directly problematic for Pettit. That something of intrinsic value (vulnerability reduction) can be produced by various means (norms, the state, robustness) does not entail that we do not instrumentally value one of these ways (robustness) because it reliably produces the intrinsic good. It is far more important for Pettit's argument that robustness is sufficient for vulnerability reduction. However, it seems robustness is not sufficient for vulnerability reduction.
First consider objective reductions via social norms. Pettit appears to conflate the role of dispositions with the role of norms. He claims the dispositions involved in attachment, virtue, and respect [...] restrict the considerations objectively relevant in the choices on which they bear, at least insofar as they are supported by associated norms. (Pettit 2015, p. 134) Yet, the social norms associated with the dispositions of robust goods are distinct from the robustness that figures in these norms. Pettit himself notes that 'attachments may be capable of forming in the absence of social norms' and, it seems equally plausible that these norms can influence behaviour when attachments have not formed. For example, if others assume the attachment of friendship is in place between A and B, they may censure A's failure to provide B favour and the threat of this censure will likely 'restrict the considerations that are objectively relevant' to A in deciding whether to provide the favour. However, these norms and their associated censure depend not on A's actual disposition, but on other's beliefs about A's disposition. The upshot is that it is the social conception of what robust goods require that provides the objective protection and this protection is enacted regardless of whether A himself holds a particular disposition.
Furthermore, even when A does have robust dispositions, it appears to be the concern about external censure and not the disposition itself that prompts the action. Pettit writes, As a friend, manifestly subject to the norm of friendship ... the consideration that you ought objectively to be registering, if you are properly informed, is that while you may secure that benefit [for yourself] by letting me down you would do so at the risk of activating my resentment, the indignation of others, and a reputation for being an unreliable, even just a fair-weather, friend. (2015, p. 131) What prompts the action is the consideration of these external costs. And while they certainly offer the form of protection Pettit is after, once again it is not the existence of a modal robust disposition that leads to this protection. However, objective reductions via social norms are not the only route to vulnerability reduction.
Let us now consider subjective reductions. Pettit claims that 'even in the absence of such [social] norms, [dispositions of attachment, virtue and respect] would protect me in a second way by limiting the considerations that you are in a subjective position to invoke ' (2015, p. 132) . The dispositions 'screen off' potentially harmful reasons from our deliberation. Yet, note that they do so only insofar as we hold the disposition; just as a despot's favoured slave is protected insofar as he is favoured. However, the disposition does not prevent A from failing to provide love. Despots are fickle and their favour often ends, so too can lovers fall out of love. It seems that love's robustness provides a subjective vulnerability reduction by definition and only insofar as the disposition persists. But is this the sort of vulnerability protection we are after? It depends on whether the persistence love-or any other robust good-is volitional.
If there is any sense in which the persistence of these goods is a voluntary matter, then is not clear that this form of protection reduces vulnerability in Pettit's sense of the term. Recall that claims 2 and 3 of Pettit's argument state that 'when another person is able to harm us, we are subject to the other's power to impose that harm or not [and] [t]hat vulnerability will not decrease just because the probability of harm decreases in any old fashion: say, because the other likes us ' (2015, p. 122) . According to Pettit's notion of vulnerability, reduction in vulnerability requires the complete removal of harmful options from another's deliberation: 'so long as I take you to be deliberating about what to do, I have to recognize that [...] I am in your power; you are free to harm me if you wish [...] a lesser probability of harm does not entail a lesser vulnerability ' (2015, p. 127) . He continues, [T] o the extent that it remains within the power of those others to let me down, denying me the benefits in question, I will have to recognize that I live in exposure to their will. I manifestly depend on their not doing that which it is fully within their power to do. I am in a decidedly vulnerable position. (Pettit 2015, p. 128) Thus, robust goods provide subjective protections only if the persistence of their associated dispositions is fully non-voluntary. If the maintenance of these dispositions is within our power, others remain vulnerable to us. Certain robust goods, like love, might indeed be entirely non-voluntaristic. Yet, it is less plausible that we lack this kind of agency in all cases of robust goods. In particular the maintenance of dispositions attached to robust goods of virtue are plausibly volitional. If this is the case, then others are not protected from our choice to maintain these dispositions and, consequently they remain vulnerable to us.
Neither of the ways in which Pettit's robust goods reduce vulnerability succeed. While social norms do reduce vulnerability, demonstrating this fact does not show that robustness reduces vulnerability, since the norms associated with robust goods are distinct from the dispositions attached to these goods. And, while the dispositions themselves may remove certain options from our deliberation, these protections only obtain if the maintenance of the dispositions attached to all robust goods is fully volitional.
Do we value robustness because it reduces vulnerability?
Let us set aside these concerns and suppose that a reliable connection between vulnerability reduction and robustness can be established. Even so, Pettit has not shown that we value robustness because it reduces vulnerability. The fact that robustness reduces vulnerability is insufficient to show that this is why we value it. Rather than arguing for this crucial claim, Pettit simply asserts it in the final step, writing, 'it is because we value this protection or security [of vulnerability reduction] that we value the robust provision of thin benefits ' (2015, p. 122) . The argument for why we value robustness thus presupposes its conclusion.
The crucial question is whether the missing argument can be supplied-is there reason to believe we value robustness for its effect on vulnerability? I will argue there is not, for two reasons. First, we can disvalue being loved, even when it reduces our vulnerability. Second, we value loving others, even though this increases our vulnerability. 5
The value of being loved. Recall that, since by Pettit's account, the good of love is simply the robust provision of the good of care, differences in the valuation of care and love must result from the latter's robustness. And the reason we value robustness, according to Pettit is that it reduces our vulnerability to others. Thus, for Pettit the reason we value love more than care is that love, being robust, reduces our vulnerability. Yet, I doubt anyone would respond to the question of why they valued love by citing the combination of mere care and vulnerability reduction. Pettit seems to misconstrue why we value being loved.
In many cases when someone loves us that we do not ourselves love, love takes the form of a bad-despite the fact that our vulnerability to them may be reduced. Even if another really loves us and their love would reduce our vulnerability, it can be a burden or an annoyance. Their love seems to demand certain behaviour or acknowledgment from us and their vulnerability to our response to them requires that we take care in how we interact with them. Love on its own is not necessarily valued, even if it is genuine.
The value that we attach to being loved by another may be sensitive to the reasons that motivate their love (a point to which I will return). A friend of mine once reported that she was upset when a person she was dating declared his love-not because she disliked him, or doubted the sincerity of his avowal, but rather because she thought he didn't know her well enough yet to love her for the right reasons. For her, being loved was valuable only if the lover valued something about her that she also recognised as being of value. I do not mean to claim this anecdote definitively identifies the value of being loved. However, it reinforces the idea that vulnerability reduction, in itself is not what we value about being loved. The value of being loved is more nuanced and depends partly on our feelings towards that person and, perhaps, on the reasons they value us. Even if vulnerability reduction is coextensive with being loved, it does not seem to be the reason we value being loved.
The value of loving another. The second challenge to Pettit's claim that we value robustness because it reduces vulnerability is that it pertains to only one half of the love relation. Pettit claims that by being loved by another, our vulnerability to them decreases because options that are beneficial to them, but harmful to us are removed from their deliberation. But he provides no account of why we value loving another. The fact that we do value loving others places additional strain on the vulnerability-based account.
When we love another our vulnerability to them-and to our own disposition-increases. 6 Pettit claims that when we love another, dispositions that are beneficial to us, but harmful to others are blocked or removed from our deliberation or are made more costly by social norms. Since these dispositions remove options that would benefit us, we are, in a sense, vulnerable to them. When we love another we are anxious to discover whether they also love us and we are horrified by the thought that they might not. 7 In this sense, we are not only vulnerable to our dispositions, we are vulnerable to others as well; to their willsor if love is involuntary-to their dispositions. And yet, despite the fact that loving another seems to entail significant increases in vulnerability, we nevertheless value being in love.
These observations suggest we value love as a broad concept (encompassing loving and being loved) for reasons beyond vulnerability reduction. The fact that we pursue reciprocal love indicates that we will readily sacrifice vulnerability reduction for the other valuable aspects of love. Yet, on Pettit's formulation, any gain in protection on the part of the beloved appears to come at the expense of the lover. This suggests that insofar as we value reciprocal love above non-reciprocal love we prefer situations that lead to no net reduction in vulnerability. Yet, if we truly valued vulnerability reduction it seems we should prefer being loved and not loving in return to reciprocal love.
In this section I've argued Pettit's account of why we value robustness encounters serious objections. First, it is unclear that the presence of robust dispositions is sufficient to reduce Pettit's sense of vulnerability. Social norms indeed limit our options to harm others, but it is the norms and not our robust disposition that constrains behaviour. Furthermore, though our robust dispositions may subjectively remove harmful options, this is true only if Pettit's robust goods are entirely non-voluntaristic. Second, even if robustness does reduce vulnerability, this does not seem a plausible reason we value either being loved, or loving another. In the case of the former, there are many cases where being loved, despite its associated vulnerability reduction, is experienced as a bad. In the latter case, it seems that when we love another our vulnerability increases, both because we 6 Note that vulnerability to our own dispositions differs from Pettit's sense of vulnerability since it does not entail exposure to the will of others. 7 This sentiment is nicely expressed in the film Love Actually when a young boy experiencing love for the first time asks his father whether there is anything 'Worse than the total agony of being in love?' are subject to their wills (or dispositions) and because we are constrained by our own dispositions.
Rehabilitating the promotional alternative
There are two alternative accounts of why we value robustness. The objective promotional account claims that we really value robust goods 'for the distinct property of being the best means feasible, however imperfect, for promoting those [thin] goods, maximizing their expected realization' (Pettit 2015, pp. 111f.) , while the subjective promotional account claims we value the capacity of robustness 'to give us peace of mind, reducing our anxiety about how others may treat us' (Pettit 2015, p. 116) . What the promotional accounts have in common is their claim that the value of robustness consists in its ability to probabilistically increase the production of certain benefits. For the objective version, the benefit is the provision of thin goods; for the subjective version it is the provision of peace of mind. Pettit argues neither promotional account can satisfactorily explain the value of robustness since the valued benefits posited by both versions can be provided more effectively by other means. In this section I will focus on the objective promotional account since, as I shall argue later, it is the most plausible promotional alternative to Pettit's own account.
Pettit's argument against objective promotion
Consider favour, the thin good associated with the robust good of friendship. When favour is robustly provided, it is provided in a greater number of possible worlds than if it were not robustly provided. This means that however the actual world turns out, the odds of favour being provided are greater, if it is robustly provided. Or, in other words, when favour is robustly provided, the expected value of the recipient's favour enjoyment increases. According to the objective promotional account, this increase in the expected enjoyment of favour is why we value robustness.
Pettit acknowledges that the robust provision of favour produces this effect, but he claims we do not value robustness because it increases the expected value because favour 'could be more efficiently promoted by paying others for the service' (2015, p. 114). He continues, ... when someone is very wealthy or powerful or famous, it becomes difficult for them to form new friendships with others. This is because it becomes difficult for them to believe that the others are concerned about them in the manner of friends, not because of the collateral benefits of association with wealth or power or fame... This for most of us is a tragic circumstance, which deprives the wealthy or powerful or famous of a great resource. But on the view that the good of friendship consists in the maximization of expected favour there is no tragedy in sight ... the person endowed with such assets will almost certainly do as well or better in the enjoyment of expected favour than someone who enjoys regular friendships. (Pettit 2015, p. 115) This argument requires some unpacking. Recall that, because Pettit claims P1. The actual and robust provisions of thin goods are necessary and jointly sufficient for robust goods (2015, p. 30), the difference between love and care, friendship and favour, and so on must consist in the robust provision of the thin goods. It follows then, that if there is a difference between the value of actual favour and the value of friendship this difference must be contributed by robustness. According to the objective promotional account, P2. The value of robustness consists in its promotion of expected thin goods.
Since (by P1) robustness is the only difference between favour and friendship and (by P2) the value of robustness is its promotion of expected favour enjoyment (which is also, presumably is the value of favour itself), we must conclude for the particular good of friendship that C1. The value of any provision of friendship is determined solely by the amount of expected favour enjoyment.
That is, the greater the favour enjoyment offered, the greater the value; any difference in value between friendship and favour must be the result of a difference in the amount of expected favour enjoyment. Pettit's story about the friendship problems associated with wealth and fame shows that in many cases these persons enjoy a great deal of favour. Recall that thin goods, like favour are 'independent of the disposition out of which [they are] performed' (Pettit 2015, p. 3) . The rich are surrounded by sycophants 8 who are at their beck and call, providing enormous favour, though for self-serving reasons. It is clear that when it comes to mere favour, P3. The expected favour enjoyment of wealth and fame can exceed the expected favour enjoyment of friendship.
If all we cared about was the objective enjoyment of favour, then as Pettit notes, such cases are not tragic. From C1 and P3 we can conclude, that C2. It is better to enjoy the favour that can be bought with wealth and fame than to have friends.
Pettit implies this final conclusion is false. Is it? Evidence against the conclusion comes from a widespread (and, for many, pretty quick and forceful) intuition that friendship is more valuable than the kind of favour associated with wealth, even if the latter can, in many cases be a good thing. Biting the bullet and accepting C2 might be more plausible if C2 held only in extreme cases. Perhaps a lifetime full of servants and flatterers would indeed be better than a short and fleeting friendship. But C2 holds under much weaker conditions. Since the premises imply that the value of these interactions is determined only by expected amounts of favour, C2 holds even in cases where the expected favour received by the wealthy is infinitesimally greater than that received under regular friendship. This strong conclusion about value is implausible. Pettit is correct, we should reject C2.
Since the argument is valid, we can reject C2 only by rejecting one of the three premises. First consider P3. We could reject P3 by insisting it is impossible to receive more favour from (paid) acolytes than from friends. The plausibility of taking this approach depends on what we take favour to be. I think that for many people, a natural first response is to insist that the good we receive from friendship differs from the good we receive from paid favour. The 'favour' that friends provide is not the same sort of 'favour' that comes from servants, subordinates, or fans. The favour we receive from friendship cannot be bought.
This strategy is promising, but we should note that we are not free to adopt any definition of favour for P3. The sense of favour that is being used in P3 is Pettit's thin sense of favour. For Pettit, favour is defined functionally-in terms of success conditions-and not with reference to the motivating reasons that prompt the action. On Pettit's account, thin goods like favour, care, and truth-telling are disposition-independent. When favour is understood in this thin sense, it is difficult to deny that it can indeed be enjoyed in greater quantities by the rich and famous, who's power ensures their whims are satisfied. Under Pettit's use of 'favour', P3 is true.
If we want to deny C2, the remaining options are to reject either P1 or P2. The first, P1, is Pettit's definition of robust goods. This premise is the central thesis of his book, so Pettit cannot take this avenue. Consequently, he rejects P2, the objective promotional account of value and concludes that we do not value robustness because it maximises the expected enjoyment of thin goods.
Evaluating Pettit's argument
Consider for a moment why conclusion C2 seems so objectionable. The intuition that prompts a natural suspicion about P3 also suggests that the good associated with friendship cannot be bought and, indeed, that it is more valuable than the good involved in mere favour. In fact, many philosophers (cf. Satz 2010) have argued that paying for care or favour changes or destroys the good that we receive. What we receive from paid care or favour is not what we receive from love or friendship. Of course, Pettit thinks this is true as well. He claims that 'to think that what you did in treating me as a friend was just to produce an act of favour, setting aside the role of the disposition, would be to miss out on the fact that you controlled in that same way for giving me favour' (Pettit 2015, p. 4 ). As we have seen, his account uses robustness to distinguish thin and thick goods.
However, there is a dilemma for Pettit's argument. If we accept Pettit's claim that thin goods are 'independent of the disposition out of which [they are] performed', then, as I shall demonstrate below, Pettit's conditions are insufficient to distinguish care from love and friendship from favour. On this horn, Pettit fails to provide sufficient conditions for robust goods and, as a result, P1 is false.
On the other hand, if, to avoid the first horn, we allow these goods to be dependent on the disposition out of which they are performed, then Pettit's argument is invalid. Because the dispositions and motives of those who provide favour for selfish reasons differ from those who provide favour out of a disposition of friendship, the claim in P3 that 'the expected favour enjoyment of wealth and fame can exceed the expected favour enjoyment of friendship' is equivocal. If the favour involved in paid favour is disposition independent and the favour involved in friendship is disposition dependent, then such a comparison makes no sense and we cannot validly conflate them to conclude, as C2 does, that 'it is better to enjoy the favour that can be bought with wealth and fame than to have friends. ' In short, P1 and P3 cannot both be true at the same time and, consequently, Pettit's argument does not provide a reason for rejecting the objective promotional account of the value of robustness. Why think thin goods must be disposition dependent if Pettit's account is to provide sufficient conditions? Consider the following case.
The fair weather friend. Consider the relationship between a sycophant (who provides favour for personal gain) and a powerful figure. The natural intuition is that the sycophant does not provide the figure with the good of friendship. Pettit also wants to exclude such cases with his robustness conditions. 9 Does he?
Suppose the sycophant provides the figure with favour in the actual world, say, by picking her up from the airport when she needs a ride. Now consider a possible world in which the primer-the figure's need for a ride-is present and 9 For example, he notes that Gwendolyn's attachment to Jack/Ernest in Oscar Wilde's The Importance of Being Earnest 'may not earn the name of love, since it transpires that it is only as deep as Jacks pseudonym' (Pettit 2015, p. 11). picking her up is not outweighed by countervailing considerations: picking her up is supported. However, suppose also that in this world the figure has lost her influence and power. Since the sycophant provides favour only to gain advantage from the influential figure, he would not provide her favour after she lost her influence. It seems that because his disposition to provide favour is fickle in this way, the actual favour he provides is mere favour and not also the robust good of friendship.
But, since friendship requires the provision of favour in all worlds where priming, support, and modest obtain, whether friendship is provided depends on whether the lost-influence world is modest. If it is modest, then, since the sycophant does't provide favour, he doesn't provide friendship in the actual world. If it is immodest, then friendship does not require the provision of favour in this world and his actual favour is friendship. 10 In order to sustain the intuition that sycophants are not (qua sycophant) friends, the world must be modest.
Unfortunately, by Pettit's definition of modesty, it is an immodest world. A world is immodest if in it 'you permanently or temporarily lose the disposition' (p. 29). Since the disposition to provide favour in the lost-influence world is lost, it is an immodest world. Note that Pettit's definition of modesty seems to imply that whether a world is modest is an open empirical question that depends on whether, but not on why dispositions are lost. Is this really the case? There are three reasons to think it is.
Pettit re-phrases the condition, noting that the variations should satisfy modesty is just to say, in more familiar language, that there cannot be factors present in those scenarios that exempt you from responsibility as a lover [or friend] or that excuse your failure to perform. (2015, p. 29) We might be tempted to interpret this formulation as a normative condition, such that whether excuses or exemptions apply depends on the reasons proper to friendship. However, Pettit follows up this reformulation with the claim that 'exemptions would apply when you lack the disposition and ... excuses when you are blocked from exercising that capacity and manifesting that disposition' (2015, p. 29). The first reason, then, to read the condition descriptively is that for Pettit,
10
Assume he also provides favour in all other worlds satisfying priming, modesty, and support. It might be objected that we cannot suppose the sycophant will provide favour in all other worlds because his sycophancy undermines his reliableness. However, his sycophancy only makes him unreliable in worlds where the figure has lost influence, but since these are immodest worlds, favour provision is not required in these worlds. Since knowing he is a sycophant only gives us reason to think he will fail to provide favour in worlds that are immodest there is no reason to think that in worlds where the influence remains he will not satisfy Pettit's conditions for friendship.
excuses and exemptions correspond to mere blocks and losses of the disposition, not to particular kinds of blocks and losses that are appropriate, given friendship's reasons.
A second reason to read the condition descriptively is that a normative interpretation of the condition would seem at odds with Pettit's claims that when individuals or the members of a subgroup spell out in detail the demands of love [or friendship] to which they hold themselves and their partners [...] then they may come to endorse quite a personalized ethic. (2015, p. 18) Yet, if there are universal reasons that give content to the modesty condition, then whether a particular change in circumstances makes a world modest or immodest would not depend on the whether particular individuals lost or retained their dispositions, but on whether they ought to have retained them. This would preclude a personalised ethic.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Pettit believes that it is robustness that distinguishes fair weather friends from true friends. Yet, as we have seen, fair weather friends can indeed satisfy priming, support and modesty (under a descriptive reading). This means they can only be distinguished form true friends by the inclusion of normative content in the modesty condition. And, in turn, it implies that the real work in distinguishing friends form lovers is being done by this normative content. Such a reading is at odds with book's project. It would mean that the conditions Pettit spends a great deal of time explicating do not distinguish care from love. Instead, what really does the work is modesty's normative content-which he does not explicate. While I think that some kind of normative appeal to motivating reasons is indeed necessary to distinguish fair weather friends from true friends, I find it difficult to interpret Pettit's formulation of modesty as a normative condition. 11 The problem presented by the fair weather friend can be generalised to a whole range of robust goods. For example, since gold diggers lose their disposition to provide care when their 'beloved' loses their wealth, lost-wealth worlds are also immodest. It is implausible that sycophants count as friends or gold diggers as lovers. Yet, since Pettit's conditions cannot distinguish these cases his conditions are insufficient. Although it is a significant hurdle for Pettit's account, the problem can be fairly easily avoided by ruling out sycophant and gold digger cases as situations that do not really involve the thin goods of care or favour. If we say that the kinds of reasons or dispositions that motivate the actual act are crucial for determining whether it is really favour, then we can rule out those acts that are, for example, motivated by selfish interests. Under this approach, sycophants do not provide real favour. And if they do not provide favour, then whatever it is they do provide cannot become friendship, no matter how robustly they are inclined to provide it. If we make thin goods disposition dependent, then P1 is true.
However, as I pointed out above, making this move undermines the validity of Pettit's argument. Making the favour of friendship disposition dependent and the favour of the sycophant disposition independent renders the move from P3 to C2 invalid. Either way, Pettit's argument against the promotional account cannot succeed.
The promotional value of robustness
It is time for recap. In the third section I criticised Pettit's vulnerability account of robustness. I questioned whether robustness really reduces vulnerability and argued that even if it does, it is not clear that this is the reason we value it. In section four I turned to Pettit's argument against the promotional account, showing that his argument cannot be sustained because it faces a dilemma. However, I
have not yet argued that there are considerations that weigh in favour of the promotional account. I shall turn to that task in this section.
Acts and dispositions
Recall that the objective promotional account claims we value robustness because it increases the probability that we will enjoy the thin goods associated with robust goods. On this account, what's great about love or friendship is that they make it more likely we will enjoy care or favour. Yet, despite the problems with Pettit's argument, the intuition remains that there is something perverse about valuing mere favour or care. And it does seem that we could obtain these thin goods elsewhere. We recoil at the thought that we should attempt to maximise thin goods-and it seems anyone who would has made a mistake in their reasoning about what is of value. Thus, even if the specific form of Pettit's objection to the promotional account is unsuccessful, its spirit is compelling.
What lends Pettit's objection power is a conflation of the acts that are associated with goods of attachment and the dispositions we have to provide these goods. This conflation is built into the core of Pettit's account. Distinguishing acts and the disposition to provide these acts can help us get clearer about why we value robustness and understand how sycophants and gold diggers differ from friends and lovers.
According to conditional analyses of dispositions, to say A is disposed to 6 under conditions C is to make the counterfactual claim that A would 6 in all (or a sufficient number of) worlds where conditions C obtained (cf. Lewis 1997; Manley and Wasserman 2008) . Dispositions are not acts, they are states of affairs. To say that A is friends with B is to say that the state in which A has a certain disposition towards B obtains. 12 And it is to say that A would perform some kind of act under certain conditions. Let us call the act that is associated with the friendship disposition a friendly act.
Friendly acts are similar to Pettit's notion of acts that provide favour, but they differ in a crucial respect. Friendly acts are motive dependent. Whether an act is a friendly act depends on the reasons that motivate its performance. When the reasons are those that are proper to friendship (whatever those may be), then the act is a friendly act. Although friendly acts provide favour, not all acts that provide favour are friendly acts. This is because not all acts that provide favour are motivated by the kinds of reasons that are appropriate for friendship: some acts that have the outcome of providing favour to others might nevertheless be motivated by fiendish reasons.
I want to suggest that A has a friendly disposition towards B (in Pettit's parlance, A provides B the good of friendship) when A is disposed to perform friendly acts for B. A is disposed to perform friendly acts iff A would perform friendly acts in a sufficient number of worlds where Pettit's priming and support conditions are satisfied. And what qualifies as a sufficient number of worlds can be culturally and contextually variable.
Note that if we weaken the condition so that friendly acts must be performed only in a sufficient number of worlds, there is no need for the modesty condition. If we were to say friendly acts (or acts of favour) must be provided in all worlds where some conditions obtain, then modesty would be required. This is because, clearly, friendship does not require the provision in all worlds satisfying only priming and support, since this would preclude friendships ending. So something else-modesty-is needed to restrict the scope of the conditional. 13 12 Though it is necessary, I doubt whether the disposition to perform friendly acts is sufficient for the relational state of 'being friends with', since I think that friendship (unlike the good of love) also requires reciprocity. In the case of friendship, either A or B may trigger the end of the friendship relation by withdrawing their disposition. That is, the friendship relation AfB obtains between the parties iff A is disposed to perform friendly acts towards B and B is disposed to perform friendly acts towards A. This is not so for love. For love, A's ceasing to be in love with B does not necessarily entail that A is no longer in love with A. 13 Indeed, Pettit himself notes that dispositions require the provision of their associated acts 'only in a comparatively high proportion of cases ' (2015, p. 26) . Now, A can also be disposed to provide the more general and motive independent acts of favour for B. But as we have seen, this causes problems for Pettit's account. If A actually and robustly performs a fiendish act that has the outcome of providing B favour, then, despite A's fiendish motivation, his provision of favour satisfies Pettit's conditions for the robust good of friendship. The restriction of the acts associated with friendship to friendly acts, which are motivated by reasons proper to friendship excludes fiendish acts from consideration.
Revisiting the promotional account
The modified version of Pettit's account I am proposing claims that (1) A provides B robust goods when A is disposed to perform motive dependent acts for B and (2) A is disposed to perform these acts when A would perform them in a sufficient number of worlds satisfying priming and support. The objective promotional account of the value of robustness, in conjunction with the modified account of robust goods can avoid the problems that confront Pettit's vulnerability approach.
The promotional account is rather plausible under this modified version because what is being maximised are acts of love or friendship, not mere care or favour. Presumably, when A provides B favour because A is paid to do so or because A wants personal gain, the reasons that motivate A's act are not those proper to friendly acts. This means that sycophants and friends provide two different kinds of good. To have someone perform a properly motivated act of friendship is ceteris paribus more valuable than mere favour, and it is even more valuable if they are disposed to perform friendly acts, since this disposition increases the probability we will enjoy-not mere favour-but properly motivated acts of friendship. Therefore, not only is Pettit's comparison between purchased favour and friendly favour inappropriate, once we understand friendship to be the disposition to perform friendly acts, the idea that we value the disposition (robustness) because it increases the probability that we will enjoy a particular kind of good is much more plausible.
Conclusion
I have argued that Pettit's claim that we value the robustness of robust goods because it reduces our vulnerability to others cannot be sustained. Not only is it doubtful that robustness can always successfully reduce vulnerability, but even when it does so, it is unclear that we value it for this reason. In some cases the robust receipt of care can be seen as a bad despite the fact that it reduces vulnerability and in others we value giving love despite the fact that doing so increases vulnerability. In place of Pettit's account, I have argued that insofar as we value robustness, what we value is the robust provision of motive dependent goods. The robust provision of such goods is valuable because it increases the probability that we will enjoy goods like loving acts or acts of friendship.
